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T

wo principles are at war in modem labor relations. One, the
principle of free choice of employee representation, underlies
all modem labor relations legislation.1 The other, the principle of
absolute proprietary rights in certain work, manifests itself in the
traditional jurisdictional dispute but occurs in a broader context as
well. The labor relations principle, an attempt to order relations between employers and employees on a civilized basis, requires collective
bargaining between employers and the representatives of their employees and further declares that the selection of representatives by
employees shall be free of coercive interference by employers. Jobseeking aggression, combatting this principle of order at every level,
would reverse the whole procedure, would make the union select
employees, and would enlist the aid of employers in the process. The
labor relations principle envisions the union as an agent whose authority to deal with employers derives from a peaceful, volitional
process; job-seeking aggression envisions the union as an autonomous
principal whose authority rests in power and is expressed in war.
The labor relations principle commands employer neutrality; jobseeking aggression by unions presses the employer into service. The
labor relations principle derives strength and direction from a premise
of free employee choice; job-seeking aggression rejects the conception
of free employee choice.
When considered in the light of certain consequences to which it
seems naturally to lead, job-seeking aggression conflicts with still another vitally important institution of modem American society,
,. Assistant Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.-Ed.
This principle is referred to herein variously as the "labor relations principle," the
"principle of modem labor relations legislation," and the ''Wagner Act principle.'' In each
case the writer uses it, as described in more detail in the text, to refer to the Wagner Act
rules (1) that employee representation is to be determined on a majority-rule basis, without
coercive interference by employers, and (2) that employers must bargain with the duly
selected representatives of their employees-and with no others.
1
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although in this instance not a legislatively established one. The
reference is to free-market capitalism. A union engaging in jobseeking aggression asserts a right to control job opportunities; it
claims a proprietary interest in jobs and tends to go on then to establish
a network of relations insulating it from the rigors of competition.
What begins in aggression ends in stagnation. Opinion may differ
as to the degree to which such a development undermines essential
free-market institutions, but there can be no doubt of the general
tendency.
In two respects, then, union action of the type involved in the
traditional jurisdictional dispute conflicts with accepted social principles
and institutions. The purposes of this paper are to examine in some
detail the nature of these conflicts; to consider the measures, existing
or proposed, for resolving them; and, finally, to set forth a solution
consistent with both the labor relations principle and the requirements
of a free-market economy.

I
In dealing with all forms of job-seeking aggression by unions, the
concern here will be with union action in a far broader context than
that of the traditional jurisdictional dispute. Essentially the same
physical facts, basic aims, and economic consequences are involved
in this subject matter, however, as in the traditional dispute. The
central point to which the discussion will first be directed is that
job-seeking aggression, in all its forms, is at odds with the fundamental
assumptions and principles of modem labor relations legislation.
The "pure" jurisdictional dispute involves two facts: first, that
the contending unions be co-affiliates of the same parent organization,
e.g., two national or international unions affiliated with the AFL or
CIO; second, that the subject-matter of the dispute be the performance
of given work. 2 A historic example of such a dispute is the one between the AFL's Teamsters and its Brewery Workers, who fought in
2 See NLRB member Murdock's dissenting opinion in Matter of Lodge 68, I.A.M.
and Moore Drydock Co., 81 N.L.R.B. No. 169 (1949). And see the following works cited
by Mr. Murdock: GREGORY, LABOR AND THB LAw 113 (1946); HORTON, DrcnoNARY OF
LABOR ECONOMICS 12 (1948); MILLIS AND MONTGOMERY, ORGANIZED LABOR 274 (1945);
PETERSON, AM.nmcAN LABOR UNIONS 258 (1945). For an interesting description of disputes between locals affiliated with the same international unions, see Rottenburg, "IntraUnion Disputes Over Job Control," 61 Q.J. EcoN. 619 (1947). Allen Bradley v. Local 3,
IBEW, 325 U.S. 797, 66 S.Ct. 11 (1945) represents perhaps the most interesting and
important recorded case involving, among other things, a dispute between locals affiliated
with the same international. See also SLicHTER, UNION PoLicms AND lNDosTRIAL MANAGEMENT 77 (1941).
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court and out for more than thirty years over the question of which
union was entitled to jurisdiction over the hauling of brewery products. 3 Other examples, past and current, are provided by the Carpenters and the Machinists,4 and the Ironworkers and the Carpenters.5
In the offing are disputes between the Teamsters and the Hod Carriers.
The recent assertion by high Teamster officials of jurisdiction over
"everything on wheels" suggests that many more jurisdictional disputes
are in the making. 6
While co-affiliation is a characteristic of the "pure" jurisdictional
dispute, common sense suggests that such a tie should not be considered essential when job-seeking aggression is the subject of study.
In fact absurd results accrue when one insists upon co-affiliation as
an essential element of the general phenomenon under investigation.
Thus, the Carpenters and Machinists have had the same kind of
3 Most of the facts in this historic dispute are covered in Green v. Obergfell, (D.C.
Cir. 1941) 121 F. (2d) 46. Those omitted there may be found in Jaffe, "Inter-Union
Disputes in Search of a Forum,'' 49 YALE L.J. 424 (1940), and Hyman and Jaffe, "Jurisdictional Disputes," in N.Y.U. FmsT AmmAL CONFERENCE ON LAlloR 423 (1948).
4 For one battle in this long war, see United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 61
S.Ct. 463 (1941). The respective jurisdictional claims of these two unions explain immediately why there can be no end of disputes between them. The "claim" of the Carpenters' Union runs as follows:
"Section 7. The trade autonomy of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners
of America consists of the milling, fashioning, joining, assembling, erecting, fastening or
dismantling of all material of wood, hollow metal or fiber, or of products composed in part
of wood, hollow metal or fiber, the laying of all cork and compo, and all other resilient
Hoor covering, all shingles, the erecting and dismantling of machinery and the manufacturing of all wood materials, where the skill, knowledge and training of a carpenter are
required, either through the operation of ~achine or hand tools.
"Our claim of jurisdiction, therefore, extends over the following divisions and subdivisions of the trade:
"Carpenters and Joiners, Railroad Carpenters, Bench Hands, Stair Builders, Millwrights, Furniture Workers, Shipwrights and Boat Builders, Reed and Rattan Workers,
Ship Carpenters, Joiners and Caulkers, Cabinet Makers, Casket and Coffin Makers, Box
Makers, Bridge, Dock and Wharf Carpenters, Car Builders, Floor Layers, Underpinners
and Timbermen, Pile Drivers, Shorers and House Movers, Loggers, Lumber and Sawmill
Workers, and all those engaged in the running of woodworking machinery, or engaged as
helpers to any of the above divisions or sub-divisions or the handling of material on any of
the above divisions or sub-divisions.
''When the term 'carpenter and joiner' is used, it shall mean all the sub-divisions of
the trade as herein specified."
The "claim" of the Machinists, as recounted in DANKERT, CONTEMPORARY UNIONISM
168 (1948) is equally comprehensive. Mr. Dankert says: "Possibly no organization describes its jurisdiction in greater detail than the Machinists' union. After marking out its
'boundaries' in more than 1,600 words this union makes certain that nothing to which it
is (or will be) entitled is left out by adding: 'All the foregoing and in addition thereto any
other work which does now or in the future may, as industries develop, fall naturally
within the scope of the jurisdiction of the International Association of Machinists. . . .' "
5 See Hansen v. Local 373, Intl. Assn. of Bridgemen, etc., 13 CCH Lab. Cas. 1[64,129
(N.J. Ch. 1947).
6 "Streamlined Unionism,'' 40 FoRTONE 154 (July, 1949).
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dispute as well when they were co-affiliates as when the Machinists
had parted company with the AFL. There is little profit in calling
the same dispute by different names, merely because the slender thread
of affiliation has been severed. The basic and essential fact remains
constant in all these cases: two unions are contending over the right
to control certain work assignments; one group of men engages in
aggressive action to take work away from other men.
In exactly the same way, it seems sound and sensible to include
the relatively frequent controversies over work between CIO affiliates
and unions affiliated with other parent organizations.7 Much more
recent in origin, as is only natural in view of the CIO's relative youth,
disputes over work between AFL and CIO affiliates are as much a
part of this study as those between the AFL's Carpenters and the
once-independent Machinists. The principal and essential element
in all such disputes is the controversy over the right to perform given
work. If such disputes had only "inward" reflections and consequences, so to speak, it might be appropriate to distinguish between
disputes among co-affiliates, on the one hand, and those among members of rival affiliations, on the other. The fact is, however, that all
these disputes have the same outward, economic, public consequences;
and, where social policy provides the point of departure, this fact
commands that they be considered as a single phenomenon.8 Accordingly, all such controversies are lumped together here as "work
7 See, for examples, Matter of Moore Drydock, 81 N.L.R.B. No. 169 (1949); Matter
of Irwin-Lyons Lumber Co., 82 N.L.R.B. No. 107 (1949).
8 Zechariah Chafee's famous article, "The Internal Affairs of Associations Not for
Profit," 43 HARv. L. Rllv. 993, written in 1930, when union strength was at a low ebb, is
as well entitled as any writing to the dubious honor of being called the intellectual midwife of the view that inter- and intra-union conflicts are not matters of public concern.
With this view, compare the position of Ludwig von Mises, to which the present writer
subscribes, as expressed in Hm,1AN AcnoN 814-815 (1949). Speaking of the way in
which intra-organization conflicts were handled in the Italian corporative State, Mises says:
"In the same way in which each municipality takes care of its local community affairs
and the national government handles only those affairs which concern the interests of the
whole nation, the guild alone should have jurisdiction over its internal affairs and the
government should restrict its interference to those things which the guilds themselves
cannot settle.
"However, within a system of social cooperation under the division of labor there are
no such things as matters of concern only to those engaged in a special plant, enterprise,
or branch of industry and of no concern to outsiders. There are no internal affairs of any
guild or corporazione the arrangement of which does not affect the whole nation. A branch
of business does not serve only those who are occupied in it; it serves everybody. If within
any branch of business there is inefficiency, a squandering of scarce factors of production,
or a reluctance to adopt the most appropriate methods of production, everybody's material
interests are hurt.· One cannot leave decisions concerning the choice of technological methods, the quantity and quality of products, the hours of work, and a thousand other things
to the members of the guild, because they concern outsiders no less than members. In
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assignment disputes." For purposes of this paper the jurisdictional
dispute is important as only one type of work assignment dispute.
Of a distinctly different type, however, is the dispute, not over
the right to control job assignments, but over the right to represent
existing employees in collective bargaining with their employer. While
loose current usage sometimes· refers to this type of controversy as
a "jurisdictional dispute," it seems desirable to call it a representation
dispute.9 There is no dispute in these cases over the right to control
the allocation of work. The unions are disputing, instead, over only
the right to represent existing employees, and no objection is registered to the employer's allocation of work. All this is not to say that
there is no relationship between a work assignment dispute and a
representation dispute. On the contrary, there is a definitely important
relationship. But the nexus is legal and theoretical; it is not factual.
The two kinds of dispute operate in entirely different complexes of
rules and assumptions. The work assignment dispute works within
a context of assumptions which are in fact at variance with those
controlling in representation disputes. Perhaps the most effective
way of pointing up the difference is to say that the representation
dispute is a normal, healthy incident of the labor relations principle,
just as the two or three-party political controversy is a normal, healthy
incident of republican government; whereas the work assignment dispute, if the thesis of this paper is correct, stands completely at odds
with the labor relations principle. As will be argued in the course
the market economy, the entrepreneur in making such decisions is unconditionally subject to
the law of the market. He is responsible to the consumers. H he were to defy the orders
of the consumers, he would suffer losses and would very soon forfeit his entrepreneurial
position. But the monopolistic guild does not need to fear competition. It enjoys the
inalienable right of exclusively covering its fields of production. It is, if left alone and
autonomous, not the servant of the consumers, but their master. It is free to resort to
practices which favor its members at the expense of the rest of the people."
9 For a long time, the NLRB was msposed to abdicate its function of determining
employee-choice of representation where two or more affiliated unions asserted the right to
represent the same employees in collective bargaining with their employer. The NLRB's
view, as evinced in Matter of Aluminum Company of America, 1 N.L.R.B. 530 (1936),
was that employee choice should be subordinated to arrangements worked out by the
unions themselves. When it became obvious that such arrangements would not always be
forthcoming, the Board began performing the function delegated it by Congress. For
NLRB developments subsequent to the Aluminum Company decision, see Matter of
Interlake Iron Corp., 2 N.L.R.B. 1036 (1937); Showers Brothers Furniture Co., 4
N.L.R.B. 585 (1937); Harbison-Walker Refractories Co., 43 N.L.R.B. 936 (1942);
Kistler Stationery Co., 51 N.L.R.B. 978 (1943); Sherman White Co., 58 N.L.R.B. 1024
(1944); William Koehl Co., 65 N.L.R.B. 190 (1946); Ash Grove Lime & Portland
Cement Co., 69 N.L.R.B. 1251 (1946); U.S. Industrial Chemicals, 71 N.L.R.B. 940
(1946); National Foundry of N.Y., 73 N.L.R.B. 16 (1947); Pacific Car & Foundry Co.,
76 N.L.R.B. 32 (1948); and Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co., 79 N.L.R.B. No. 140
(1948). See also note in 38 CoL. L. R:av. 1243, 1245 et seq. (1938).
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of this paper, the relationship between the two kinds of dispute
should be clearly and expressly-as it is now unclearly and indirectly
under the confused procedures of the Taft-Hartley Act-such that all
work assignment disputes are resolved by the procedures applied by
agencies like the National Labor Relations Board in the ordinary
representation dispute. In any event, it is sufficient to observe at this
point that the representation dispute is essentially different from the
work assignment dispute.
The same is not true, though, of the kind of case in which a
union engages in aggressive action to secure for its members work
which is currently being performed by employees who are members
of no union at all.10 It is submitted here that from the point of view
of the labor relations principle, precisely the same basic phenomenon
is involved here as in the types of cases which have heretofore been
classified as work assignment disputes. The labor relations principle
is violated whenever a union takes aggressive action to secure for its
own members work which is being performed by other workers. The
violation is essentially the same, whether or not the worker-victims are
members of another union, because in either case the aggressor union
seeks representative status in a manner at odds with the procedures
envisioned by the labor relations acts-self-determination of representation by existing employees is circumvented. Furthermore, the
aggressor union presses the employer into service, when the labor
relations acts operate on a fundamental premise of employer neutrality.
The contention here is, in brief, that all cases of job-seeking aggression
by unions are, in the light of the labor relations act principle, fundamentally the same; that they all conflict basically and radically, and in
exactly the same way, with that principle.
The point may be clarified by a more detailed examination of the
interior structure of the labor relations principle, and by a comparison
of that principle with the structure of labor relations antedating it in
this country. Prior to the modern era of labor relations legislation,
the law had nothing to say with respect to collective bargaining rights
and duties. Employers could bargain collectively with representatives
of their employees, or they could refuse to do so, just as they chose.
More significantly, employers could refuse to bargain with a union
which represented a clear majority of their employees, on the one
hand; and they could, on the other hand, bargain with a union even
though that union counted among its members not a single one of their
10 For one example of this type of case, see Schwab v. Motion Picture Machine
Operators, 165 Ore. 602, 109 P. (2d) 602 (1941).
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employees.11 The employer was free to recognize a union to which
none of his employees belonged, install that union as exclusive bargaining representative, and indeed discharge existing employees in
order to make a place for members of a union which he favored or
which had exerted irresistible pressure for recognition. While this
kind of action probably did not occur commonly, it could and did
occur with some frequency, sometimes owing ultimately to the aggression of strong unions, sometimes as an employer tactic to defeat independent unionization of employees. In either case, the employees
themselves stood as hapless pawns, having their jobs taken away from
them or having thrust upon them representatives not of their own
choosing.
It is to the credit of such legislation as the Wagner Act that it
was based upon a set of assumptions at variance with this kind of
cynical exploitation of employees. But it is to the discredit of this
legislation that it failed to supply the implementation necessary to
suppress all such victimization. \i\7hile aiming at supplanting the
"jungle law" of labor relations, and while succeeding partly in doing
this by preventing employers from foisting favored unions on their
employees, the Wagner Act and other legislation following its lead
contained no effective measures for preventing equally predatory
union action.
Yet, while effective counter-measures were lacking, the whole
thrust of this labor relations legislation suggested disapproval of jobseeking aggression by unions as well as of the creation of puppet
unions by employers. Thus, one of the central features of the Wagner
Act commanded employers to bargain with the duly authorized representatives of their employees-and with no others. This is the famous
decree of section 9 (a), repeated verbatim in the 1947 amendment of
the Wagner Act: "Representatives designated or selected for the
purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in
a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective
bargaining. . . ."12 Vitally supplementing this provision, the act set
up effective machinery for the determination of employee choice,13
and it went on to provide that an employer was guilty of an unfair
11 Jt may be well to recall here that in the celebrated case of Apex Hosiery Co. v.
Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 60 S.Ct. 982 (1940), the union taking criminally aggressive action
numbered only eight of the company's 2,500 employees among its members.
12 49 Stat. L. 449, §9(a) (1935), 61 Stat. L. 136, §9(a) (1947), 29 U.S.C. (Supp.
IV, 1951) §159(a). Italics added.
13 49 Stat. L. 449, §9(c) (1935).

504

MICHIGAN

LAw REvmw

[ Vol. 50

labor practice if he refused to bargain with the union chosen by a
majority of his employees.14 A clear corollary of this principle and
its implementing procedures and rules must have been that employers
were no longer free to recognize and deal with unions which did not
represent existing employees, or which a majority of employees had
rejected.
But the existence of the corollary need not be based on inference
from the use of the word "exclusive" in section 9 (a). Other provisions
of the act remove all doubt. Employers violated section 8 (1) of the
Wagner Act if they extended favors to one of two competing unions,15
or even if they favored a union before a competitor union appeared.16
Under section 8 (2), further, an employer could not "contribute
financial or other support" to a union.1 7 Both these provisions clearly
show that employers were no longer free, as they were at common
law, to deal directly with unions not chosen by their employees. To
do so would constitute favoritism of the union, a type of conduct
condemned in innumerable cases under the Wagner Act. (And if an
employer acted unlawfully in favoring a union, did it make good
sense, good law, or good social policy to leave unions free to use force
to compel employers to favor them?) But we have yet to meet the
Wagner Act provision which most clearly suggests disapproval of
job-seeking aggression by unions.
That provision, contained in section 8 (3) of the act, made it an
unfair practice for an employer, ''by discrimination in regard to hire
or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." Both
as written and as interpreted by the National Labor Relations Board
and the courts,18 section 8 (3) stood patently at odds with job-seeking
14 Id.,

§8(5).
v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72, 61 S.Ct. 83 (1940); see also Midwest Piping &
Supply Co., Inc., 63 N.L.R.B. 1060 (1945); cf. NLRB v. Standard Steel Spring Co., 18
CCH LAB. CAS. 1[65,675 (1950).
16 Abinante & Nola Packing Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 1288 (1940).
17 Cf. NLRB v. Automotive Maintenance Machinery Co., 315 U.S. 282, 62 S.Ct.
608 (1942); NLRB v. Bradford Dyeing Assn., 310 U.S. 318, 60 S.Ct. 918 (1940);
NLRB v. Falk Corp., 308 U.S. 453, 60 S.Ct. 307 (1940); NLRB v. Link-Belt Co., 311
U.S., 584, 61 S.Ct. 358 (1941);-National Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 60 S.Ct.
569 (1940); NLRB v. Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines, 303 U.S. 261, 58 S.Ct. 571 (1938);
NLRB v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 319 U.S. 50, 63 S.Ct. 905 (1943).
18 The following cases represent tolerably well the way in which the Board and the
courts interpreted §8 (3): Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 57 S.Ct. 650 (1937);
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S.Ct. 615 (1937); Phelps Dodge
Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 61 S.Ct. 845 (1941). There are, of course, literally multitudes of decisions on this section. For a comprehensive collection, see 2 CCH Lab. Law
Rep. (4th ed.) ,r 4000-4095 (1949).
15 I.A.M.
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aggression by unions. Action taken by unions to compel employment
of their members at the expense of either members of rival unions or
nonunion members puts pressure on the employer to commit an unlawful act. It is designed to compel him to discriminate, in respect to
employment, in favor of the aggressor union. In the typical work
assignment dispute a union either strikes, pickets, or boycotts in order
to make the employer assign to its members work which is being performed by others.19 The vVagner Act clearly commanded employers
not to give in to such pressure, but it unfortunately failed to provide
measures which would effectively stiffen the back of employers caught
in such circumstances.
There is one more feature of the earlier labor relations legislation
which must be given attention here-the circumstances in which compulsory unionism contracts such as the closed shop were permitted.
In a work assignment dispute, the aggressor union insists that only
its members are entitled to perform the disputed work. While this
assertion may be made in the absence of a demand for a closed-shop
contract, it amounts nevertheless to an insistence upon closed-shop
conditions; for the essential element in any closed shop is the proprietary
right in jobs which it gives to the contracting union. But, under the
Wagner Act, employers could accept and operate under closed-shop
conditions only where the contracting union had been freely chosen
by a majority of employees in an appropriate bargaining unit. 20 In
the typical work assignment dispute, therefore, where a union not
representing any existing employees insisted that employees be discharged to make room for its members, that union was asking the
employer to flout the requirements of the labor relations acts. 21 It was
asking for a closed shop notwithstanding its lack of representative
status. Once again, for an employer to accede to the union's demands
in such circumstances was plainly to violate the direct command of the
labor relations legislation.
The foregoing discussion establishes that all job-seeking aggression
by unions is radically and comprehensively at odds with the theory of
labor relations expressed even in the earlier labor relations acts. Vir19 Cf. NLRB v. Gluek Brewing Co., (8th Cir. 1944) 144 F. (2d) 847; NLRB v.
Hudson Motor Car Co., (6th Cir. 1942) 128 F. (2d) 528; NLRB v. Star Publishing Co.,
(9th Cir. 1938) 97 F. (2d) 465.
20 Cf. NLRB v. Electric Vacuum Cleaner Co., 315 U.S. 685, 62 S.Ct. 846 (1942);
Virginia Electric and Powei: Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 63 S.Ct. 1214 (1943); Wallace
Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 65 S.Ct. 238 (1944).
21 Cf. I.A.M. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 72, 61 S.Ct. 83 (1940); NLRB v. Electric Vacuum
Cleaner Co., 315 U.S. 685, 62 S.Ct. 846 (1942).
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tually at every point this kind of union action challenged the effectiveness and the theoretical structure of such statutes as the Wagner Act.
Notwithstanding this basic and thoroughgoing conflict, however, the
whole legal institutional framework was such, for a long time, that
job-seeking aggression and the related phenomenon of pressure for
recognition in the absence of majority status were allowed to continue,
to sabotage a national policy largely orientated in favor of labor unions,
and often to place intolerable burdens upon employers.
On a number of occasions, employers confronted with job-seeking
and other related forms of aggression by unions sought relief from
equity courts, contending that the union action ran counter, as it
patently did, to the requirements of the labor relations acts. Some
state courts22 and at least one federal court:2 3 granted injunctions. However, the failure of the Wagner Act to provide for union unfair practices
or to strengthen the position of employers in such disputes, and the
existence of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, combined with a somewhat
unusual judicial refusal to coordinate the existing labor relations legislation,24 operated to create a general rule holding the employer without
22 For example, the Oregon Supreme Court. See Schwab v. Motion Picture Machine
Operators, 165 Ore. 602, 109 P. (2d) 602 (1941). See also Park & Tilford Corp. v.
. Teamsters, 27 Cal. (2d) 599, 165 P. (2d) 891 (1946). Compare Stillwell Theatre, Inc. v.
Kaplan, 259 N.Y. 405, 182 N.E. 63 (1932), a strictly common law decision, handed down
before either labor relations or anti-injunction legislation had been enacted, in which the
New York Court of Appeals refused to enjoin one motion picture operators' union from
picketing before a theatre the owner of which was already under contract with a rival union.
Such picketing, according to the court, is a permissible technique of competition between
unions, and "resulting injury [to the employes] is incidental and must be endured." Cf.
Florsheim Shoe Stores v. Retail Salemen's Union, 288 N.Y. 188, 42 N.E. (2d) 480 (1942),
where New York's highest court recognized the conllict between the labor relations principle and aggressive union action.
23 Oberman & Co. v. United Garment Workers, (D.C. Mo. 1937) 21 F. Supp. 20,
involved a suit for injunction against a strike and picketing for recognition by one union
when another had been certified by the NLRB as exclusive employee representative. District
Judge Reeves held that the NLRB certification had terminated the dispute over representation which existed prior to that certification. The ''labor dispute" being ended, the antiinjunction features of the Norris-LaGuardia Act [49 Stat. L. 70, §§4, 13 (1932), 29 U.S.C.
(1946) §§104, 113] were held to be inapplicable since they are relevant only in cases
where the court finds that a ''labor dispute" as defined in §13 of the Norris Act exists. Cf.
also the first two opinions handed down in the lengthy litigation between the Donnelly
Garment Co. and the International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union. These two opinions
are to be found at (D.C. Mo. 1937) 20 F. Supp. 767 and (D.C. Mo. 1937) 21 F. Supp.
807. The latter decision, granting a temporary injunction, was mistakenly handed down
by a three-judge court, with District Judge Otis dissenting in a lengthy and entertainingly
sarcastic opinion. See the Supreme Court's per curiam opinion in 304 U.S. 243, 58 S.Ct.
875 (1938). Ultimately, the temporary injunction was vacated, in (D.C. Mo. 1938) 23 F.
Supp. 998, (8th Cir. 1941) 119 F. (2d) 892, rehearing denied 121 F. (2d) 561, after it
had been affirmed on technical grounds in (8th Cir. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 309.
24 Integrating the NLRA and the Norris Act to permit an injunction against aggressive
action in defiance of an NLRB certification would seem to be a simpler task than the one
accomplished by the Supreme Court in United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 61 S.

1952]

UNION JOB-SEEKING AGGRESSION

507

relief in such circumstances. 25 The anti-injunction acts, state and
federal, were the principal barriers. They expressly withheld from
the courts the power to issue injunctions in labor disputes, and, since
strikes, boycotts, and picketing in work assignment cases manifestly
involved labor disputes, the courts were literally correct.26 The net
result, however, was extremely unfortunate for employers and for
many employees. Confronted with aggress~ve action by unions, employers found themselves in an excruciating position. They ordinarily
could not get relief from the courts; still, if they gave in to the aggressor
union, they were guilty of unfair practices under the \i\7agner Act.
If members of one union were replaced by members of the aggressor
union, the chances were that the victimized union would retaliate
with either a picket line of its own or unfair practice charges.27 The
NLRB offered a little consolation: in certain circumstances it would
not require the employer to give back pay to the unlawfully discharged
employees.28 But this concession was narrowly circumscribed,29 and,
in any event, it by no means eliminated all the problems, economic and
otherwise, raised by the job-seeking aggression. Then, too, there was
the plight of the individual employees involved. Their livelihood,
Ct. 463 (1941), where the Sherman, Clayton, and Norris Acts were "harmonized" to eliminate any possibility of convicting a labor union under the Sherman Act where it acted
alone. The New York Court of Appeals had no trouble accomplishing the integration. See
the Florsheim case, 288 N.Y. 188, 42 N.E. (2d) 480 (1942).
2 5 See the history of the Donnelly case sketched in note 23 supra. And see Yoerg
Brewing Co. v. Brennan, (D.C. Minn. 1945) 59 F. Supp. 625; American Chain & Cable
Co. v. Truck Drivers, (D.C. N.J. 1946) 68 F. Supp. 54; Fur Workers Union, Local No. 72
v. Fur Workers Union, (D.C. Cir. 1939) 105 F. (2d) 1, affd. per curiam, 308 U.S. 522,
60 S.Ct. 292 (1939); Cupples Co. v. AFL, (D.C. Mo. 1937) 20 F. Supp. 894. Cf. the development in Retail Food Clerks v. Union Premier Food Stores, 1 CCH Lab. Cas. 1[18, 170
(D.C. Pa. 1938), (3d Cir. 1938-39) 98 F. (2d) 821, 101 F. (2d) 475, 308 U.S. 526, 60
S.Ct. 376 (1939); and Johnsen & Co. v. Hahn, 1 CCH Lab. Cas. 1[64, 695 (D.C. N.M.
1948); Duris v. Phelps Dodge Copper Products Corp., 17 CCH Lab. Cas. 1[65, 453 (D.C.
N.J. 1949).
2 6 Section 4 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act [49 Stat. L. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. (1946)
§§101-115] clearly prohibits the issuance of an injunction against many forms of union
action-including strikes, picketing, and boycotts-"in any case involving or growing out of
any labor dispute.•.." The term "labor dispute," as defined in §13 of the Norris Act, includes beyond any question disputes between unions, disputes concerning job allocation,
and all representation disputes. Cf. Yoerg Brewing Co. v. Brennan, (D.C. Minn. 1945)
59 F. Supp. 625. For surveys and discussions of analogous state legislation, see Smith and
DeLancey, "The State Legislatures and Unionism," 38 MICH. L. REv. 987, 1013-1020
(1940); Millis and Katz, "A Decade of State Labor Legislation," 15 Umv. Cm. L. REv.
282 (1948); KILLINGSWORTH, STATE LABOR RELATIONS Acrrs (1948).
27 See the cases cited in note 19 supra.
28 New York & Porto Rico S.S., 34 N.L.R.B. 1028 (1941); see also Motor Products
Corp., 34 N.L.R.B. 1236 (1941).
29 Greer Steel Co., 38 N.L.R.B. 65 (1942); Romec Pump Co., 57 N.L.R.B. 167
(1944).
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usually spoken of as a primary concern of trade unions, was as cynically
subordinated by union aggression as it is often said to be by the free·
market.
It is evident, then, that job-seeking aggression by labor unions was
at odds with the fundamental aims and premises of even the earlier
labor relations legislation. Whereas free employee choice of representatives and neutrality on the part of employers were basic structural
components of the Wagner Act type of legislation, job-seeking aggression would reject free employee choice and enlist the intervention of
employers. Such aggression can be called an atavistic, regressive
phenomenon in this sense: that it would, at a time when legislation
had established relatively civilized rules for the determination of employee choice, go back to the days when a union gained representative
status and work for its members, by the sheer pressure of force.

II
Perhaps the wave of state and national legislation explicitly curbing job-seeking aggression by unions constitutes the best evidence of
the regressive, socially undesirable nature of such union action. It is
interesting to note that even clearly "pro-labor" public. figures such as
President Truman30 and Senator Morse,31 and middle-of-the-road politicians such as Senator Lucas of Illinois,32 have recorded .their opposition to at least one type of job-seeking aggression-that represented by
the traditional jurisdictional dispute. But still there is conspicuous
difference in principle among existing legislative measures, and among
the proposals for the future. Indeed, as will be shown in detail
presently, the Taft-Hartley Act, the most comprehensive attack on jobseeking aggression ever enacted, is 'rife with internal confusion, conflict,
and redundancy. Currently the whole issue is still very much alive,
and present measures cannot, and should not, be regarded as permanently settling the various problems raised by job-seeking aggression.
State measures, which may be dealt with briefly, are of two general
kinds. The more usual type of state statute outlaws aggressive union
30 The President recommended legislation against traditional jurisdictional disputes in
his State of the Union message to Congress of January 1947 and has repeated the proposal
several times since then. See I LEGISLATIVE HxsTORY OF THE Luion MANAGEMENT RELATIONS Ar:::r, 1947, p; 921 (1948) (referred to hereinafter as "L.H."). The President's
recommendations were embodied in S. 249, as introduced, 81st Cong., 1st sess. (1949) (the
''Thomas-Lesinski" bill), a measure which is discussed presently herein.
812 L.H. 1554. Senator Morse proposed arbitration as the most suitable procedure,
provided the arbitrators' decisions "would be binding and final and enforceable in the
courts."
32 2 L.H. 995-997.
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action in connection with the traditional type of jurisdictional dispute. 33
Strikes, picketing, and boycotts are declared to be unlawful where their
object is to secure work for members of one union at the expense of
members of another. 34 No mention is made of the case where aggressive action is taken to secure work for union members at the expense of
nonunion employees.
A second, more restricted type of state legislation, establishes a
procedure for the settlement of the traditional type of jurisdictional
dispute, a procedure largely similar to the type proposed by the Truman
Administration in the spring and summer of 1949. The most notable
example of such state legislation is the Minnesota statute. Since there
has been little or no practical experience under this statute, and since
the analogous Administration proposal will be examined presently,
there is no need to deal with the Minnesota statute here. Its text will
be found in the footnote. 35
33 For a review of such legislation, see the works cited in
34 The California statute is typical. Secs. 1115 and 1116

note 26 supra.
of the California Labor Code
declare that jurisdictional strikes are "against the public policy of the state" and "unlawful."
Section 1118 of the code defines a "jurisdictional strike" as:
"(I) any ••• concerted interference with an employer's operation or business arising
out of a controversy between two or more labor organizations as to which of them has or
should have the exclusive right to bargain collectively with an employer on behalf of his
employees or any of them (2) or arising out of a controversy between two or more labor
organizations as to which of them has or should have the exclusive right to have its members
perform work for an employer."
These provisions were held constitutional in Meyers v. Cleaners & Dyers' Union, 17
CCH Lab. Cas. 11 65,655 (Super. Ct., L.A. Co. 1950). In A.F.L. v. Bain, 165 Ore. 183,
106 P. (2d) 544 (1940), the Oregon Supreme Court struck down a statute which prohibited strikes, picketing, and boycotts in jurisdictional disputes as well as in all cases in which
there was no employment relationship between the employer and the aggressor union. The
decision was based, of course, on the "picketing-free speech" decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, beginning with Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 60 S.Ct. 736 (1940).
Decisions by the Supreme Court in 1949 and 1950 suggest that state action outlawing
aggression by unions in jurisdictional disputes will not be held unconstitutional as a violation of the right of free speech. See the cases cited in note 67 infra. These decisions continue to suggest, however, that picketing may not be outlawed merely because an employment relationship is lacking between the employer picketed and the picketing union. See
Petro, "Picketing and Freedom of Speech," 1 LAB. L. J. 675 (June, 1950).
35 A statute comparable to the Minnesota act was repealed by the Missouri legislature
in the summer of 1949 (H.B. 20, Laws, 1949). The Minnesota procedure for the settlement of jurisdictional disputes (Minn. Stat., ch. 179, § 179.083) reads as follows:
"Whenever two or more labor organizations adversely claim for themselves or their
members jurisdiction over certain classifications of work to be done for any employer or in
any industry, or over the persons engaged in or performing such work and such jurisdictional
interference or dispute is made the ground for picketing an employer or declaring a strike or
boycott against him, the labor conciliator shall certify that fact to the governor. Upon receipt
of such certification the governor, in his discretion, may appoint a labor referee to hear and
determine the jurisdictional controversy. If the labor organizations involved in the controversy have an agreement between themselves defining their respective jurisdictions, or if they
are affiliated with the same labor federation or organization which has by the charters
granted to the contending organizations, limited their jurisdiction, the labor referee shall determine the controversy in accordance with the proper construction of the agreement or of
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The measures provided for in the Taft-Hartley Act and the proposals submitted by the Administration in 194936 provide adequate
material for a full discussion of all the issues raised by union jobseeking aggression. As a matter of fact, the Taft-Hartley Act contains
so many approaches to the whole subject that a complete analysis
might be based on it alone. In two vital respects, however, the 1949
Administration proposal is relevant. \Vhereas the Taft-Hartley Act
prohibits all job-seeking aggression, the Administration proposal would
restrict aggressive union action only where it is designed to take work
from members of another union. 37 Again, the Administration proposal
would permit effective and final awards of work to a union,38 whereas
basic structural features of the Taft-Hartley Act make it practically
impossible, as we shall soon see, to issue such awards. These are
matters of some complexity, and further consideration will be postponed until the various relevant measures of the Taft-Hartley Act
have been unravelled.
The first relevant measure, the Taft-Hartley prohibition of the
closed shop, calls for a demonstration of how such a prohibition undercuts all job-seeking aggression. In every case of job-seeking aggression,
the union asks the employer to hire only its members. Where a union
strikes, pickets, or boycotts to compel the employer to hire its members
exclusively-and, if necessary, to discharge members of another union
or nonunion employees-the objective of the action is a condition
factually the same as that which exists under the closed shop, even
though the union may make no demand for a closed-shop contract.
Hiring of the members of one union, exclusively, is, in short, exactly
the condition prevailing under the closed shop. Section 8 (a) (3) of
the National Labor Relations Act, as amended in 1947 by the Taftthe provisions of the charters of the contending organizations. If there is no agreement or
charter which governs the controversy, the labor referee shall make such decision as, in consideration of the past history of the organizations, harmonious operation of the industry, and
most effective representation for collective bargaining, will best promote industrial peace. If
the labor organizations involved in the controversy so desire, they may submit the controversy to a tribunal of the federation or labor organization which has granted their charters
or to arbitration before a tribunal selected by themselves, provided the controversy is so submitted prior to the appointment by the governor of a labor referee to act in the controversy.
After the appointment of the labor referee by the governor, or the submission of the controversy to another tribunal as herein provided, it shall be unlawful for any person or labor
organization to call or conduct a strike or boycott against the employer or industry or to
picket any place of business of the employer or in the industry on account of such jurisdictional controversy."
36 See S.249, as introduced, 81st Cong., 1st sess., §§106Cb) (12), Cc) C6), Cd), and
Ce) (1949).
37Jd., §106 (b) (12).
38 Id., §106 Cd).
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Hartley Act, generally prohibits all discrimination in hiring, and,
unlike the corresponding section in the original NLRA, it does not
contain a proviso privileging such discrimination where committed pursuant to a bona fide closed-shop contract executed with a majority
union. Consequently, both discrimination in hiring and the effectuation of other closed-shop conditions is prohibited to employers by
section 8 (a) (3).39 Furthermore, making perfectly clear its opposition to all job-seeking aggression by unions, the act goes on in section
8 (b) (2) to prohibit union action designed to cause an employer
to violate section 8 (a) (3), thus supplying the link missing in the
Wagner Act.40 It is an unfair practice for a union, under section 8
(b) (2), to "cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate
against an employee in violation of sub-section (a) (3) . . . ." The
plain meaning of the two subsections, when read together, is that both
the employer and the union are guilty of unfair practices where the
union undertakes job-seeking aggression and where the employer gives
in, by either discriminating in hiring, or by firing nonunion men,
in favor of members of the aggressor union.41
It might be concluded, then, solely on the basis of these provisions,
that all job-seeking aggression by unions is forbidden by the TaftHartley Act. However, the matter is placed beyond all doubt by the
wording of section 8 (b) ( 4) (D) of this act. That subsection explicitly
outlaws union job-seeking aggression whether the victims be either
members of rival unions or nonunion employees. It is an unfair
practice for a union, under section 8 (b) ( 4) (D), to engage in, or to
induce employees of any employer to engage in, a concerted refusal
to work where an object of such action is "forcing or requiring any
employer to assign particular work to employees in a particular labor
organization or in a particular trade, craft, or class rather than to employees in another labor organization or in another trade, craft, or
class, unless such employer is failing to conform to an order or certification of the Board determining the bargaining representative for
employees performing such work." The twice-used phrase-"or in a
particular trade, craft, or class"-was deliberately added to the legisla39 Cf. Matter of National Maritime Union, 78 N.L.R.B. No. 137 (1948) enf'd. (2d
Cir. 1949) 175 F. (2d) 686, cert. den. 338 U.S. 954, 70 S.Ct. 492 (1950), rehearing den.
339 U.S. 926, 70 S.Ct. 620 (1950).
40 Ibid. And see Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 81 N.L.R.B. No. 164 (1949).
41 Ibid. Cf. Julius Resnick, Inc., 86 N.L.R.B. No. 10 (1949); Daniel Hamm Drayage
Co., 84 N.L.R.B. No. 56 (1949). Even while applying the statute against unions, however,
the NLRB displays a characteristic reluctance to pursue Taft-Hartley policies as vigorously
as it did those of the Wagner Act. Cf. Petro, ''Union Liability for Back Pay Under the
NLRA,'' 2 Lui. L. J. 83 (Feb. 1951).
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tion in a joint conference of the House and the Senate.42 Referring to
this addition, Mr. Claude Pepper, then Senator from Florida, contended
on the floor of the Senate that it would open the door to "unionbusting" activities by employers.43 His argument was that the phrase
would give employers carte blanche to substitute nonunion men for
union members, leaving the union with no recourse. The contention is
clearly not well taken. Of course employers can always, if they choose,
discriminate against union members in this manner. But such action
is as definitely unlawful today, under the Taft-Hartley Act, as it
was under the Wagner Act.44 The Senator's argument is sound only
if it is sound to say that the NLRA's prohibition of employer discrimination has been ineffectual; but statistics concerning the growth of union
membership during the period covered by the Wagner Act suggest
that the prohibition of employer discrimination has been highly effective.45 Be that as it may, the specific and deliberate addition of the
disputed phrase indicates beyond any doubt that the Taft-Hartley
Act makes all job-seeking aggression by unions unlawful.
In view of the two separate approaches just considered, both
effectively undercutting all job-seeking aggression, it is somewhat
surprising to find in the same statute a measure which suggests that
in some circumstances unions may be awarded a proprietary interest
in jobs. With all discrimination in hiring prohibited by section 8 (a)
(3), with union pressure to compel such discrimination outlawed by
section 8 (b) (2), and with all job-seeking aggression condemned by
section 8 (b) ( 4) (D), one might have concluded that the TaftHartley Act was designed with utter single-mindedness to put to rest
the idea that unions should have a controlling voice in job allocations.
Most analysts have tended to view these measures as an attempt to
restore to employers all control in regard to hiring and allocation of
work among the various trades, crafts, or classes of employees, subject,
42The jurisdictional dispute provision in §8(b) (4) (D) of S.1126, 80th Cong., 1st
sess., as passed by the Senate on May 13, 1947, did not contain the phrase. Sec. 2(15) of
H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st sess., both as introduced on April IO, 1947, and as passed by the
House on April 18, 1947, did .contain the phrase. And the phrase appeared in the bill,
H.R. 3020, which finally became law on June 23, 1947, after the Senate voted to override
the President's veto.
43 2 L.H. 1589.
44 The employer discrimination provision contained in §8 (a) (3) of the NLRA, as
amended by the Taft-Hartley Act, repeats verbatim the original language of §8 (3) of the
Waguer Act. The only change in the section is concerned with compulsory unionism contracts, a change not at all related to the subject discussed in the text.
45 Union membership in 1935, when the Wagner Act was enacted: 3,728,000. Membership in 1947, when the act was amended: 15,414,000. fLumBooK OF LAlloR STATISTICS,
BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS 130 (1947). Most recent guesses are that union membership
has climbed to well over 16,000,000 since 1947.
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of course, to the ban against discrimination.46 This view is challenged,
however, by certain phases of section IO Ck) of the act.
Section IO Ck), viewed generally, sets up a kind of arbitration
procedure designed to swing into action whenever the kind of conduct
·prohibited by section 8 Cb) C4) CD) has occurred. It provides that:
'Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an
unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph C4) CD)
of section 8 Cb), the Board is empowered and directed to hear
and determine the dispute out of which such unfair labor practice
shall have arisen, unless, within ten days after notice that such
charge has been £led, the parties to such dispute submit to the
Board satisfactory evidence that they have adjusted, or agreed
upon methods for the voluntary adjustment of, the dispute. Upon
compliance by the parties to the dispute with the decision of the
Board or upon such voluntary adjustment of the dispute, such
charge shall be dismissed."
While this section envisions "determinations" of disputes of the
kind covered by section 8 Cb) C4) CD) either by the National Labor
Relations Board or by the parties themselves, it is shot through with
inconsistencies and a deplorable lack of coordination with other
features of the act. In the first place, it is difficult to conceive of a
satisfactory private method of settling a dispute involving action by
a union designed to take jobs away from nonunionized employees.
It is true that where the dispute is between rival unions appropriate
settlement machipery may be set up by the unions and the employers
involved, as has been done in the construction industry.47 The case
is different, however, where nonunion employees are the victims of
job-seeking aggression by unions, action which is clearly an unfair
46 Of course, a modified type of proprietary interest in jobs is available even under the
most rigorous interpretation of the Taft-Hartley Act. That is, a union may have a unionshop contract provided that it satisfies all the conditions of §8 (a) (3), including majority
standing, specific authorization by employees, and what amounts to open membership policies. However, this is a far cry from the kind of proprietary interest implicit in the closed
shop. This watered-down type of union shop does not qualify in any degree the right of the
employer to hire whom he pleases; it gives the union the right to require membership and
dues only in regard to employees selected entirely by the employer. The closed shop, on the
other hand, gives the union the preponderant hiring power, leaving the employer only with
a veto.
47 The Building and Construction Trades Department of the AFL,' the Associated
General Contractors of America, and certain other associations of employers in the building
industry have set up a private forum for the settlement of jurisdictional disputes between
AFL unions in the industry. The agreement sets up a "Joint Board" presided over by an
"impartial chairman" and provides, among other things, that "any decision or interpretation
by the Joint Board shall immediately be accepted and complied with by all parties signatory
to this agreement." The full text of the agreement is reproduced in 2 CCH LAB. LA.w RBPORTS (4th ed.) ,rl4,028 (1949) and in 2 hm. & LAB. RBL. RBv. 411 (1949).
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practice under section 8 (b) ( 4) (D) except where the employer is
failing to abide by an NLRB certification or order. Plainly, only the
NLRB will be in a position to "determine" disputes cif this character.
But as soon as the concept of NLRB determination is advanced,
even more perplexing problems arise, especially when the other features of the Taft-Hartley Act which have just been discussed are
considered. How can the NLRB "determine" a dispute under section
10 (k) when two vital, central features of the act are the prohibition
of the closed shop and the unqualified outlawing of union job-seeking
aggression? Take a concrete case, one in fact which the NLRB has
been called upon to "determine." Members of the International Association of Machinists were hired by the Westinghouse Company to
install certain turbines in a power project. Practically all of the other
workers on the project, employed by other contractors, were members
of various AFL craft unions. The_ Millwrights division of the
Brotherhood of Carpenters, feeling itself entitled to the turbine-installation work, arranged for a general boycott of the project, in an endeavor
to secure that work. The ·boycott being a plain violation of section 8
(b) ( 4) (D), a charge to that effect was filed, calling for a "determination" under section 10 (k). 48 What possible determinations are open
to the Board in such a case? Can it award the work permanently to the
Millwright-Carpenters? Obviously not, for two reasons: first, that
union has not been certified as the exclusive representative of Westinghouse employees, in fact represents no existing Westinghouse employees,
and therefore has no right to even the watered-down type of unionshop contract available under section 8 (a) (3) of the act; 49 second,
an award of the work to the Millwrights would violate the act's
prohibition of the closed shop-would give the union indirectly what is
prohibited by both sections 8 (b) (2) and 8 (b) ( 4) (D). 50 Perhaps,
then, the "right" solution in such a case is to award the work to the
Machinists, confirming the employer's fait accompli. Even here, however, an insuperable obstacle is met. Such an award would amount
to the grant of a closed shop, a prize to which no union is entitled,
according to provisions of the act already discussed. 51 The situation
is such, in summary, that the NLRB can really take no positive action
at all in section 10 (k) cases, and this the Board has recognized in the
48 Matter of L.A. Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 83 N.L.R.B. No. 76 (1949), affd.
19 CCH Lab. Cas. 1f66,088 (9th Cir. 1950).
49 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid. And cf. note 46 supra.
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several "determinations" handed down thus far. 52 It is forced, instead,
to rule only that the aggressor union· has "no· right" to take any jobseeking action. The Board has held-and rightly so, it is submitted,
in view of the general structure of the act-that tradition and custom
in the industry with respect to work allocation is immaterial: At bottom,
according to the Board, there is room for only representation disputes
under the act; a union can make a claim for work only if it is the
representative selected by a majority of employees in an appropriate
bargaining unit. Its first and last word on the subject has been expressed as follows: 'We are aware that the employer in most cases
will have resolved, by his own employment policy, the question as to
which organization shall be awarded the work."53 This statement
suggests that it is no longer possible for a union to put the cart before
the horse-to gain representative status before the employees have
selected it as bargaining representative.
Can the case be decided differently where the work sought by an
aggressor union is being performed by nonunion employees? The
same answer seems necessarily to follow here. The Board simply cannot
award disputed work to an aggressor union which numbers less than a
majority of the existing employees among its members, for to do so
would be, once again, to award a closed shop under conditions in which
even a union-shop contract would not be permissible, in view of the
majority-vote and majority-status requirements of section 8 Ca) C3)
of the act.54
One may reasonably conclude from all this that section l O Ck) is, ·
at least in regard to determinations by the NLRB, a deplorably illconceived redundancy. It requires the NLRB, already one of the
most overworked of government agencies, to go through completely
sterile motions. If the foregoing analysis is sound, the act ·might
just as well have eliminated section l O Ck). For the Board can do
nothing in section l OCk) proceedings that it could not do as well in the
established representation and unfair practice proceedings. In fact,
the Board itself holds that section l O Ck) proceedings are only
52 Matter of Moore Drydock Co., 81 N.L.R.B. No. 169 (1949); Juneau Spruce Corp.,
82 N.L.R.B. No. 71 (1949); Irwin-Lyons Lumber Co., 82 N.L.R.B. No. 107 (1949);
United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners, 88 N.L.R.B. No. 169 (1950); W. R.
Chamberlin & Co., 94 N.L.R.B. No. 67 (1951); Teleprompter Service Corp., 95 N.L.R.B.
No. 199 (1951). Cf. Winslow Bros. & Smith Co., 90 N.L.R.B. No. 188 (1950).
53 L.A. Bldg. & Constr. Tr. Council, 83 N.L.R.B. No. 76 (1949), affd. 19 CCH Lab.
Cas. 1f66,088 (9th Cir. 1950).
54 Direct Transit Lines, Inc., 92 N.L.R.B. No. 257 (1951); New London Mills, Inc.,
91 N.L.R.B. No. 86 (1950).
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"interlocutory" in character, and that final action by it, even in jurisdictional disputes, can come only in the standard complaint proceedings
under section IO (c) of the act.55
However, it might be argued, as some have, that the NLRB should,
in section IO (k) proceedings, meet the issues "headon," supplying
its own criteria with which to make effective awards of work.56 Without going into the various criteria offered by these would-be legislators,
it seems sufficient to observe that, failing specifically stated criteria
by the duly authorized legislators, and failing any other indication that
the Congress intended the NLRB to disregard the prohibition of the
closed shop, such action by the NLRB would be a thoroughly unjustified usurpation of legislative authority. When Congress has spoken
so clearly against certain action as it has done in the Taft-Hartley Act
against the closed shop and all kinds of job-seeking aggression by unions,
it seems simply unthinkable that the Board should proceed in a manner
other than the one it has adopted.t• 1
In the light of these considerations, the provision for private settlements of jurisdictional disputes becomes even more startling. The
whole structure of the Taft-Hartley Act, as has been repeated here so
often, indicates a clear congressional disapproval of the closed shop
and of union job-seeking aggression. Such an attitude can proceed,
it seems, only from the assumption that the selection of employees and
the allocation of work is best left with employers. And yet, despite
all this, section IO (k) permits private settlements without even stating
expressly that employers or their representatives must participate in
those settlements.58 Of course, it may be that employers are considered
"parties to such dispute," in the words of section IO (k), but, even so,
the provision for private settlements plainly invites dispute-determinations flatly at odds with the general policies of the act against the closed
shop and job-seeking aggression. For it can scarcely be expected that
private agencies will be as scrupulous to adhere to these general policies
as the NLRB has been. On the contrary, it is to be expected that
definite and relatively perpetual awards of work will be made to one
of the competing unions by private settlement agencies, leaving the
55 Matter of L.A. Bldg. & Constr. Tr. Council, 88
56 See especially Dunlop, "Jurisdictional Disputes,"

N.L.R.B. No. 241 (1950).
in N.Y.U. SECOND AmroAL CoNPERENCE ON LABoR 479 et seq. (1949); Fisher, ''The Settlement of Work Jurisdictional
Disputes by Governmental Agencies," 2 IND. & LAB. Rm.. REv. 335 (April, 1949). Cf.
Hyman and Jaffe, "Jurisdictional Disputes," in N.Y.U. FmST AmroAL CoNPERENCE ON
LABOR 423 (1948).
57 Cf. Middle States Telephone Co. of lliinois, 91 N.L.R.B. No. 99 (1950).
58 A deficiency which caused the NLRB to upset the private settlement in the Middle
States Telephone case, 91 N.L.R.B. No. 99 (1950).
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employer with no future voice in the matter. But there is no need to
rest upon speculation in this regard. The agreement establishing the
one private agency created to take advantage of the opportunity afforded
by section 10 (k) clearly envisions definite awards. of work.59 And it
was the "impartial chairman" of this agency, Mr. John Dunlop, who
urged the NLRB to meet "head-on" the problems of jurisdictional
disputes under the section 10 (k) procedure.60 If Mr. Dunlop urged
the NLRB to make definite awards, there can be no doubt that his
agency is making such awards.
Section IO (k) thus confronts us with this double anomaly: it
requires the NLRB to go through useless motions, and, even worse,
it permits of diametrically opposed decisions in cases which may be on
all fours. The latter situation exists, of course, in those cases where
a private agency makes a definite award of work to one union on the
basis of a prior decision, or tradition and custom in the industry, or
some criterion which may seem appropriate and controlling. As has
been shown, had the same situation come before the NLRB, that agency
would, in virtually all cases, confirm the allocation made by the employer.61 On the whole, the probability is that a similar determination
by a private agency will occur in perhaps 50 per cent of the cases,
and then not because of any adherence to the basic principles of the
labor relations acts, but because tradition in the industry or some other
such criterion indicates the appropriateness of the employer's allocation. Thus we observe_ the spectacle of decisions depending not on
their facts, but on the agency making them.
Fortunately for the future sanity and coherence of the labor relations law field, it is not likely that the present Taft-Hartley situation
will be with us forever. But before becoming jubilant over the prospect
of change, it will be well to inspect the products which have been
offered thus far.
The basic measure offered by the Truman Administration in 1949
would outlaw strikes, picketing, and boycotts in the traditional type of
jurisdictional dispute-i.e., the dispute over jobs between rival unions. 62
Nothing in the Administration proposal would affect job-seeking
aggression against nonunion employees. The Administration is apparently disposed, then, to permit the continuation, pro tanto, of the
conflict between job-seeking aggression by unions and the democratic
59 See footnote 47 supra.
00 In the paper cited in note

56 supra.
61Cf. Winslow Bros. & Smith Co., 90 N.L.R.B. No. 188 (1950).
62 S. 249, 81st Cong., 1st sess., as introduced, §106 (b) (12) and (d).
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labor relations principle inherent in such legislation as the Wagner
Act. To be blunt, the Administration shows itself willing to permit
the "jungle law" to prevail as long as only nonunion employees are
hurt by the jungle warfare. Its allegiance to peaceful, civilized procedures is singularly selective; it wants peaceful methods of settlement only in those instances where warfare might hurt the union
movement. One of the classic ironies of our times appears in the fact
that the allegedly "anti-labor" forces, usually symbolized by Senator
Taft, insisted in Congress during the summer of 1949 that the TaftHartley prohibition of all job-seeking aggression be continued.63 Their
position, turning everything topsy-turvy as it may, would provide a
shield for all workers, union or nonunion, against the jungle warfare
of job-seeking aggression-indeed a strange product of "anti-labor"
machinery.
While disagreeing on this poi11:t, the Administration and antiadministration forces in Congress agreed in 1949 that some procedure
analogous to that contained in section IO (k) of the Taft-Hartley Act
should be created. Most interesting of all, these usually irreconcilable
forces agreed in all important respects as to the type of procedure which
should be substituted for the one obtaining today under section l 0
(k). 64 The only important difference between the two proposals was
that the Administration procedure would operate only in the case of
a dispute between two or more unions, while the Taft procedure would
be operative in all cases of job-seeking aggression by unions. 65 Aside
from this difference, both measures would give the disputing unions
themselves an opportunity at first to settle the dispute. Failing such
a disposition of the dispute, both measures provided for settlement
by either the NLRB or an arbitrator appointed by the NLRB. The
Taft procedure would require the Board or an arbitrator to act; the
Administration measure was couched in permissive terms. Perhaps
the most vital feature of both proposals was that, unlike the existing
section l O (k) procedure, they set forth certain standards. These
standards were not, however, made binding on either the NLRB_ or any
arbitrator it might appoint. Instead, both proposals stated that "In
determining the dispute, the Board or the arbitrator, as the case may
be, may" take the following.standards into consideration:
S. 249, 81st Cong., 1st sess., as passed by the Senate, June 30, 1949.
See §106 (d) of S. 249 as introduced, and §10 (k) of S. 249 as passed.
65 The bills differed also in that the procedure of the Administration proposal could
swing into action while a dispute was only threatened, while the Taft procedure would become operative only after aggressive action had Hared out.
63
64
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I. Any prior Board certification under which the unions
involved claim the right to represent employees who are or may
be hired or assigned to perform the work tasks in dispute.
2. Any union charters or interunion agreements purporting
to define areas of jurisdiction between or among the contending
labor organizations.
3. The decisions of any agency established by unions to consider such disputes.
4. The past work history of the organization involved in the
dispute.
5. The policies of the act.
Needless to say, this procedure departs substantially from the
presently effective section 10 (k) procedure. It manifestly envisions
an effective award of work to one of the contending unions. Although
it expressly states that the policies of the act "may" be considered in
making the award, the very fact that the statement is permissive,
rather than mandatory, indicates that the NLRB or the arbitrator need
not give controlling significance to •those policies. In short, if other
criteria suggest that the members of an aggressor union ought to have
the disputed work, for one reason or another, the resultant conflict
with the fundamental principles of modem labor relations legislation
which has been emphasized here becomes irrelevant: the award might
conceivably go to a union which did not have majority status; it might,
in consequence, enlist the employer's aid in a manner which would,
in all other circumstances, amount to even Wagner Act unfair practices;
and it would create closed-shop conditions in favor of a union which,
to begin with, would not satisfy the Wagner Act requirement of majority standing. There can be no doubt about it. An arbitration provision of the type just discussed would be inherently inconsistent with
the democratic labor relations principle, regardless of whether that
principle is expressed in the Wagner or the Taft-Hartley type of legislation.
Before entering upon this paper's final area of inquiry, it will be
well, now that the conflict between existing measures and the democratic labor relations principle has been explored, to sketch briefly
proposals which would erase that conflict. While this can be done
by some pruning of the tangled measures of the Taft-Hartley Act,
the whole job could be done even more easily with some assistance
from the courts and with a slight modification of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act-simply by pursuing logically the premises and provisions of the
Wagner Act. That is to say, if there were some method whereby
employers, trying to obey the mandates of the Wagner Act, could
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secure injunctive relief against job-seeking aggression by unions, there
would be no necessity of any complex legislative revision. 66 It would
be necessary only to amend the Norris Act to permit the issuance of an
injunction against union action designed to compel an employer to
violate the anti-interference and anti-discrimination provisions of the
Wagner Act. Since unions engaged in job-seeking aggression always
try to get employers to interfere and to discriminate in their favor,
this simple amendment of the Norris Act would provide a complete
remedy for embattled employers. The Supreme Court has recently
shown that it would find no constitutional debility in such a measure,67
and the measure has merit also in the tactical sense that it would pose
grave problems for the rhetoricians in Congress. It would take some
courage and much ingenuity to oppose a measure so clearly designed
to reinforce the basic principles of the Wagner Act.
An almost equally simple alternative would be to repeal section
10 (k) and to amend section 10 (1) of the Taft-Hartley Act to require
the NLRB General Counsel to seek an injunction against job-seeking
aggression, just as he must against the other union activities made
unlawful by section 8 (b) ( 4). These revisions would leave in effect
section 8 (a) (3), section 8 (b) (2), and section 8 (b) (4) (D), which,
all in all, constitute as effective a combination of measures against
job-seeking aggression as can be imagined. Together they prohibit
employer discrimination in employment possibilities, union coercion of
employer discrimination, and, overlapping both, strikes, picketing, or
boycotts designed to make an employer allocate work to members of the
aggressor union.
What has been said thus far indicates two things: first, that jobseeking aggression of all kinds is at odds with the fundamental principles of modern labor relations legislation, and, second, that a complete
and unqualified prohibition of such aggression is both consistent with
the labor relations principle and a simple matter to effectuate on the
technical level. It remains now to spell out the completely independent
politico-economic reasons favoring this course of action.
66 Jaffe v. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union, (S.D. N.Y. 1951) 97 F. Supp. 443,
is suggestive. There the NLRB sought and secured an injunction against a union which

had flagrantly continued strike action in defiance of an NLRB order designed to compel the
union to cease committing unfair practices. There would seem to be no good reason for
denying employers the right to seek injunctive relief directly against obviously unlawful
union conduct.
67 See Giboney v. Empire Storage Co., 336 U.S. 490, 69 S.Ct. 684 (1949); Hughes v.
Superior Court of Contra Costa County, 339 U.S. 460, 70 S.Ct. 718 (1950); Teamsters v.
Hanke, 339 U.S. 470, 70 S.Ct. 773 (1950); Building Service Employees v. Gazzam, 339
U.S. 532, 70 S.Ct. 984 (1950).
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III
The case for flatly outlawing job-seeking aggression does not
rest on the requirements of the labor relations principle alone. It rests
as well in the essential requirements of a free-enterprise, free-market
capitalist economy. In order to understand how job-seeking aggression
challenges this economic system, it will be necessary to look even more
closely at the underlying drive and the natural, external consequences
of such aggression, and then to consider the drive and its consequences
in the light of the requirements of a free-market economy. The
assumption in such an approach is, of course, that the maintenance
and even improvement of the free-market economy are goals of policy
today, shared by union leaders, businessmen, and politicians alike.
Many events and activities, including job-seeking aggression, challenge
the validity of this assumption, it is true; and it may be that the assumption should be examined in detail here. But the subject is vast, and
probably beyond the present writer's competence; besides, the whole
issue of the free market versus other forms of economic organization
has been considered exhaustively by the great economist, Ludwig von
Mises, in his recently published treatise, Human Action.68 It is sufficient to say, in these circumstances, that the present writer sees in the
free market the only intelligible-and, in any case, the most desirable
-form of economic organization within our experience.69
As material for further study of the motivations and the reasonably
expectable economic consequences of job-seeking aggression, it is
desirable to examine three typical cases, taken from real life. The firstthe Schwab case-involved efforts by a motion picture machine operators'
union to force an employer to award work which was currently being
performed by nonunion employees to members of the union.70 Little
68Yale Press, 1949. Compare another product of the Yale Press in that year, LINDBLOM, UNIONS AND CAPITALISM. The relatively wide notice received by Lindblom's
book, as compared with that received by Mises, indicates that at least in the publishing area
a pea-shooter may attract more attention than a battleship. While recognizing the social
values of capitalism (e.g. at 37-38) and apparently arguing that no available alternative offers
as much (see chapters 14-16, 18), Lindblom arrives somehow at the conclusion that we shall,
because of the inevitable forces in unionism, be well rid of capitalism (see chapters 17-18,
especially at pages 253 et seq.). Mises, treating the same subject, but exhaustively and
without avoiding any issues, demonstrates as clearly as logic can that-given the present
preferences of men for freedom, peace, leisure, and material walfare-no other SYStem, however emotionally attractive to some, promises to fill the bill as well as free-market capitalism.
69 For a brief summary of the essential attributes and accomplishments of capitalism,
see Loucxs AND HooT, CoMPARATIVE EcoNOMIC SYSTEMS, 3d ed., 44 et seq. (1948).
70 Schwab v. Motion Picture Machine Operators, 165 Ore. 602, 109 P. (2d) 600
(1941). Cf. Wilson v. Hacker, 19 CCH Lab. Cas. 11 66,059 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Erie Co.
1950) where a union picketed to take over jobs being performed by barmaids. Justice
Halpern issued an injunction.
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more need be said of this type of case, at the moment, than that a union
engaging in such action seeks the livelihood of other men under color of
no tight except that accruing to it by virtue of its physical strength, its
willingness to use that strength, and its callous disregard of the position
of other workers.
Let the celebrated Hutcheson case serve as the second subject of
study. There, it will be remembered, the Anheuser-Busch Company
engaged members of the Machinists' Union to perform work which
the Carpenters' Union thought it should have, and the Carpenters
thereupon engaged in many forms of aggressive action-strike, picketing,
boycotts-in ord~r to compel Anheuser-Busch to reallocate the work. 71
A traditional jurisdictional dispute, the Hutcheson case nevertheless
involved facts physically the same as those in the Schwab case: 72 one
group of men, under color of no legal right, engaged in aggressive
warfare to take work away from other men.
The third case, a far more complex one, will bring out a form of jobseeking aggression which has not always been recognized as such.
The reference is to the situation created in New York City by Local
No. 3 of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (AFL),
as revealed by the Allen Bradley case. 73 In collusion with certain businessmen, Local 3 had established an arrangement under which the
New York City market for electrical products was closed to producers
outside the city, even though many of those producers employed members of unions belonging, like Local 3, to the IBEW. Heavy gainers
from the wall against imports were the union, its members, and the
businessmen involved; heavy losers were New York City consumers,
and workers and businessmen in other cities and states.74
11 United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 61 S.Ct. 463 (1941).
72 Supra at note 70.
73 Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, !BEW, 325 U.S. 797, 66 S.Ct. 11 (1945).
74 The arrangement set up by the electricians in the Allen Bradley case is by no means

unique. A similar arrangement has been set up by the carpenters. See United Brotherhood
of Carpenters and Joiners v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 67 S.Ct. 775 (1947). And
by the photoengravers. See Philadelphia Record Co. v. Manufacturing Photo-Engravers'
Assn., (3d Cir. 1946) 155 F. (2d) 799. And allegedly by the plumbers. See United
States v. Central Supply Assn., 12 CCH Lab. Cas. ,r 63,701 (D.C. Ohio 1947). Cf. United
States v. San Francisco Electrical Contractors' Assn., 9 CCH Lab. Cas. ,r 62,406 (D.C. Cal.
1944); United States v. Bay Area Painters, (D.C. Cal. 1943) 49 F. Supp. 733. See generally SLICHTER, UNION PoLICIEs AND lNnusTRIAL MAN°AGEMllNT 214 (1941) passim;
DUNLOP, WAGE DETERMINATION UNDER TRADE UNIONS, c. 6 (1944); LINDBLOM,
UNIONS AND CAPITALISM, c. 14 (1949); Wolman, "Industry-Wide Bargaining," 1 LAB.
L. J. 167, 173-174 (Dec., 1949). The late Henry C. Simons saw in such union action one
of the grave threats posed to free-market capitalism. See "Some Reflections on Syndicalism,''
first published in 52 J. PoL. EcoN. 1 (March, 1945) and reprinted in SIMONS, EcoNOMIC
POLICY FOR A FREE SOCIETY, c. 6 (1948).
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Relevant for present purposes in these cases is the threefold development they evince, progressing from the simple notion of a
proprietary interest in jobs felt sufficiently strongly to justify jobseeking aggression, through a detailed classification of work tasks, to,
finally, a concerted effort to insulate a union's members from all the
rigors of a free market. As has been said earlier herein, the cases show
that what begins in aggression ends in stagnation.
The first element to be noticed, the most obvious, is the desire to
get work. This is what stands out starkly in the Schwab case, the first
case given. But no issue can be taken with this desire, as such; jobseeking is a universal necessity, and socially desirable as well. The
important fact, for present purposes, resides in the manner adopted to
satisfy this desire in the Schwab case: The union members waged
what amounted to aggressive warfare to secure jobs; they did not pretend that they could better serve the public. A subterranean premise
for the aggressors in such action must necessarily have been that,
somehow, they were entitled to the work involved. Here, then, is the
concept which must be examined-the concept of proprietary rights in
work. Can this concept be squared with free-market capitalism?
Fundamental in free-market capitalism, and one of its most socially
desirable features, is the working principle that employment relationships are as completely voluntary on both sides as they can be in a
world where all men are required to work, if they wish to live; where
all employers must have employees; and where, ultimately, status in
the productive complex depends on service to the community. If workers are to have proprietary rights in jobs, which they may assert by
aggressive action, it must surely follow that employers should have
proprietary rights in the maintenance of their businesses. Further
study of the cases selected will show how this follows in practice, as
well as in logic. But then a situation is created in which the most valuable of capitalism's contributions-freedom, fluidity, responsiveness to
changing supply and demand conditions, and material progresssimply cannot exist. As will appear more clearly, in a moment, proprietary rights of union members in jobs or of employers to a place in the
productive complex cannot be squared with a free-market capitalist
economy. It is not necessary to say any more at present of the signifrcance to this study of the notion of proprietary rights in jobs, except,
for those enamored of the idea of special subsidies, that if the concept
of proprietary rights would be destructive of capitalism where prevalent
over the whole economy, it cannot be condoned or winked at in a single
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instance. If recent history teaches anything, it teaches that there is no
stopping when the subsidy process once begins.
History and straight thinking about the facts of life and human
nature instruct us to look for another development, once the concept
of proprietary job interests gains acceptance. The natural tendency of
those who acquire a proprietary right in jobs is to go to great lengths
in the refinement of the exact content of those jobs and to push the
right for all it is worth. The aggression in the Hutcheson case was
articulated on the premise that the particular kind of work in dispute
there "belonged" to the Carpenters. Thus it is that we see the careful,
scrupulous attention to detail manifested by so many of the building
trades. The situation today has come nowhere near that prevailing in
older days; yet some examples of practices in medieval England are not
without relevance. A statute was passed in 1363 forbidding merchants
to trade in more than one ware and directing artificers and "handicraft
people" to "hold them every one to one mystery."75 A case decided in
1624 cited precedents from the time of Edward II and Edward III
"that brown-bakers should not bake white bread nor white-bakers
brown bread; that bricklayers should not plaster with lime and hair,
which is proper to plasterers; nor archers make bows or bowyers arrows;
nor cobblers make boots or shoes, which belong to shoemakers." 76 In
1690, an English judge declared that "he that uses one trade cannot
use the trade of another for or about the commodity used in his own
trade; a coachmaster cannot make the wheels for his own coaches, a
wheelwright cannot use the trade of a smith."77 (All may supply,
from their own experience, modem trade union practices which are
reminiscent of these ancient regulations.) It is probably no accident
that, contemporaneously ~ith such regulation, there was a good deal
of legislation restraining the dismissal of employees by their employers. 78 An even more striking fact is that forced labor was rather common in the American colonies and Tudor England. 79 There is a tendency, it seems, for one type of restrictionism to evoke other types.
No attempt is being made here to write a history of labor regulation, and there is no pretense of historical exhaustiveness. These
75 37 Edw. m, cc. 5, 6. Cited in SANDERSON, REs'I'IIAINTS OF TRADE IN ENGLISH LAw
11, note (e) (1926).
76 The Bricklayers and Tilers v. The Plasterers, [1624] 2 Rolle 391, 81 Eng. Rep. 871.
Cited in SANDERSON, REs'I'IIAINTs OF TRADE IN ENGLISH LAw 11, note (e) (1926).
11 Hobbs v. Young, [1690] 1 Show. 241, 266-267, 89 Eng. Rep. 547, per Holt, C.J.
Cited in SANDERSON, REs'I'IIAINTs OF TRADE IN ENGLISH LAW 11 (e) (1926).
78 MoRRis, GOVERNMENT AND l.ABon IN EARLY AMERICA 17-18 (1946).
10 Id. at 3-13.
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examples from earlier days are cited only because of their suggestive
value as to the differences between the· relatively static economy, where
one's position was often largely determined for him by heredity and
law, and the B.uid, dynamic, progressive free-market economy where,
by and large, there are no external institutional restrictions, and where
advancement ultimately depends on one's service to the community.
In the modem capitalist economy, the assiduous, almost metaphysical elaboration of the content of jobs in which unions assert proprietary
rights is an anomaly. The teaching of modem science-of Darwin,
of Einstein, and of current nucleonics-is that change, B.uidity, eternal
mutation and transformation characterize the real external world. This
has always been true of the world; there has never been a static earth
or universe. The difference between mankind today and the men of
the middle ages is that more people better apprehend the fact-and
that, at least in America, an economic system better equipped to cope
with this pervasive, eternal transformation and change has developed.
For perhaps the central and essential excellence of free-market capitalism lies in its ready adaptability to changing supply and demand factors,
factors as changeable as we have learned that the external world is.
But once again the adaptability proceeds directly from the principle
that there are no vested interests which cannot be dislodged, no companies which cannot be put out of business where their service to the
community proves inferior to that of others, no rigid classification of
skills and job content which cannot be eschewed in favor of a method
which utilizes resources more efficiently. The attitudes and the legal
institutions most appropriate to free-market capitalism are precisely the
opposites of those obtaining where great emphasis is placed on proprietary right in jobs and elaborate, overweening definition of job content.80
For those who would object on the ground that an undesirable
degree of social insecurity results, it is necessary only to point to a few
of the products of this alleged insecurity: electric light bulbs have eliminated the kerosene lamp and the candle; telephones and telegraph,
the courier and other primitive forms of communication; gas and electric refrigeration, the ice box; automobiles, the horse and buggy; automatic washing machines, the washboard, etc. Are there those who
would contend that a net social loss has accrued, or that the businessso The most elaborate and convincing demonstration of these characteristics of freemarket capitalism, within the present writer's knowledge, may be found in Misns, HUMAN
AcnoN (1949). Unfortunately, the demonstration must be gathered from perusal of various parts of that extensive book (889 pages). A citation to this page or that is of little value
where the demonstration is a product of coherent exposition throughout a whole book.
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men and workers displaced by these transformations were hurt more
than all people have been benefited? Certainly some were hurt, but,
without minimizing the dislocations, it should be remembered that the
displaced workers and businessmen were not put up against a £.ring
wall, shoved into a gas chamber, or sent to Siberia. Other opportunities were provided them. And, in the process, more wealth, more jobs,
more good health, more leisure, more widespread acquisition of the
basic educational tools, and more simple human dignity for more
people have been created than has been recorded in the whole prior
history of this planet. 81 The point which cannot be overemphasized is
that none of these universally cherished gains could have been realized
had attention been preoccupied with the position of existing workers
and businessmen. The current vogue for security, expressing itself as
it so often does in terms of proprietary rights in jobs and overweening
definition of job content, is a deadly obstacle to a greater good; it is, in
simple terms, a mistaken notion of the path to what most people consider a better life.
Furthermore, those who protest against free-market capitalism on
the score that it is "materialistic" miss the point. The demand for material things and the uses to which the free-market's products are put
are entirely other matters. An economic system cannot be condemned
or rejected, rationally, because it serves its purposes surpassingly well.
Indeed one of the precious features of capitalism is that it allows people to reject its products, to refuse to take part in the productive game.
There are surprisingly few takers; few who avail themselves of both
these opportunities.
It is time now to examine the last case selected for study, and to
integrate it into the analysis of the ultimate economic consequences of
job-seeking aggression and the concept of proprietary rights in work
which underlies it. · The Allen Bradley case is for these purposes an
evolutionary microcosm, showing in a most significant way the natural
bent of the concept of proprietary rights in work and the end-products
of job-seeking aggression.
Complete job-security cannot exist without complete security for
the employer. Although classical liberal economists have been aware
of this fact for a long time, Local No. 3 of the IBEW learned it only
in the process of negotiations with employers of electricians in New
York City. Unlike the classical liberal economists, who saw a greater
81 Cf. LouCKs and HoOT, CoMP.ARAnvB EcoNoMic SYSTEMS, 3d ed., 44 et seq.

(1948).
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permanent security for all in the temporary insecurity of some, Local
No. 3 did something about it. 82 Finding that established businessmen
are often as interested in security as labor unions are,83 Local No. 3
undertook to do what it could to establish security for the New York
City employers directly and for its own members indirectly. It ordered
its members to refuse to install electrical products fabricated outside
the city. Since there could be scarcely any electrical installations except
by members of Local No. 3, the embargo was eminently successful,
from the point of view of the employers and the union.
But can free-enterprise capitalism survive this kind of an arrangement? Certainly not, if it becomes a general phenomenon; and, once
again, if it cannot be tolerated for all, on no respectable basis can it be
tolerated for one. The very essence of the system we avowedly desire
is the free market, the meeting-ground of supply and demand. Where
producers are denied admittance to markets, free-enterprise capitalism
simply does not exist. The name for the system of markets protected
by restrictive labor action is, or should be, syndicalism. As a basic
structural feature in the architecture of syndicalism, all forms of jobseeking aggression must be prohibited, if free-market capitalism is to
survive.
Conclusion

Both the free market, then, and the democratic principle of modern
labor relations legislation argue strongly for the outlawing of job-seeking aggression which has been proposed here. It must be emphasized
82 For examples of the same type of action by other unions, see the cases and writings
cited in note 74 supra.
83 Dr. Slichter has shown how widespread the desire for security is among businessmen
by simply recounting examples of their attempts to insulate themselves from the rigors of
competition. Consider the following paragraph from SucHTEn, UmoN Poucms AND
INnusTRIAL MANAGEMENT 204-205 (1941):
''The railroads fought the Panama Canal, which among other things was a labor-saving device; existing retail outlets oppose new methods of distribution, such as chain stores
and supermarkets; glass bottle manufacturers seek to prevent the use of paper milk bottles
(and have succeeded in some markets); the basing point system had among its several purposes the discouragement of the erection of new and more conveniently located plants; stockyard and commission men have tried by legislative action to restrict direct buying of hogs by
packers; small bankers fight branch banking; the NRA codes were full of restrictions on the
introduction of new equipment. Business, if permitted to organize for the purpose, would
erect high barriers against innovations-a protective tariff, so to speak, in favor of the existing
against the new. Employers sometimes use unions to fight technological innovations. The
flint glass workers' union, for example, was encouraged in 1899 by lamp chimney manufacturers to fight the lamp chimney machine in the plant of the MacBeth-Evans Company.
The operators of thin-vein mines supported the efforts of the United Mine Workers to restrict the use of coal cutters by the thick-vein mines. Indeed, one of the dangers of national
agreements between unions and associations of employers is that the agreements will be used
by the less progressive employers to retard technological changes by progressive employers."
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that this is not a proposal designed to "bust unions" or to place insuperable obstacles in the path of unionization and collective bargaining.
It is a proposal, instead, designed merely to eliminate from the union
movement one of its most egregious and regressive outgrowths, to make
coherent and therefore more secure all the components of modem labor
relations legislation, ~d to liberate the mar~et from one of its sorest
threats. The time has come when serious efforts must be bent to the
reconciling of the union movement with the basic requirements of free. enterprise capitalism. For one or the other-and ultimately both-of
these institutions must surely disappear if current trends continue
unimpeded.
Those who, while piously attesting allegiance to "free enterprise,"
nevertheless refuse to accept this thesis, are simply unwilling to accept
the basic thrust of free markets, free competition, and free enterprise.
They will say that the proposal is reactionary, anti-progressive, antiliberal-meaning thereby, of course, that they themselves are of a positive frame of mind, progressive, and liberal. In answer to them it is
necessary to quote only th~e words of Ludwig van Mises: 84
"Those fighting for free enterprise and free competition do
not defend the interests of those rich today. They want a free
hand left to unknown men who will be the entrepreneurs of tomorrow and whose ingenuity will make the life of coming generations more agreeable. They want the way left open to further
economic improvements. They are the spokesmen of progress."
84 M:csEs,

HUMAN

ACTION

83 (1949).

